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This paper presents a method of assessing cable routing for systems 
with significant cabling to help system engineers make risk-in-
formed decisions on cable routing and cable bundle management. 
We present the Cable Routing Failure Analysis (CRFA) method of 
cable routing planning that integrates with system architecture tools 
such as functional modeling and function failure analysis. CRFA 
is intended to be used during the early conceptual stage of system 
design although it may also be useful for retrofits or overhauls of 
existing systems.
 While cable raceway fires, cable bundle severing events, and 
other common cause cable failures (e.g., rodent damage, chemical 
damage, fraying and wear-related damage, etc.) are known to be 
a serious issue in many systems, the protection of critical cabling 
infrastructure and separation of redundant cables is often not taken 
into account until late in the systems engineering process. Cable 
routing and management often happens after significant system 
architectural decisions have been made. If a problem is uncovered 
with cable routing, it can be cost-prohibitive to change the system 
architecture or configuration to fix the issue and a system owner may 
have to accept the heightened risk of common cause cable failure. 
Given the nature of cables where energy and signal functions are 
shared between major subsystems, the potential for failure propaga-
tion is significant. 
A System Design Method 
to Reduce Cable Failure 
Propagation Probability 
in Cable Bundles
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Through a more complete understand-
ing of power and data cabling requirements 
during system architecting, a system de-
sign can be developed that minimizes the 
potential for collocation of critical cable 
infrastructure. Reductions in critical ca-
bling collocation may lead to a reduction in 
potential failure propagation pathways. The 
CRFA method presented in this paper relies 
on functional failure propagation probability 
calculation methods to identify and avoid 
potential high-risk cable routing choices. 
The implementation of the CRFA method 
may help system engineers to design systems 
and facilities that protect against cabling 
failure propagation events (cable raceway 
fires, cable bundle severing events, etc.) 
during system architecture. Implementing 
CRFA in the system architecture phase of 
system design may help practitioners to 
increase system reliability while reducing 
system design costs and system design time.
1. Background
The CRFA method presented in this pa-
per relies upon several key areas of existing 
research and industry methods including 
complex system design, Functional Failure 
Modeling (FFM), and Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA). The important aspects 
of each area necessary to understand and 
make use of the CRFA method are reviewed 
in this section.
With increasing system complexity, 
design methods used for relatively sim-
ple product design are replaced by design 
methodologies specifically suited for com-
plex systems [1, 2]. Functional modeling 
is often used in the early conceptual phase 
of system design (generally referred to as 
system architecture although this definition 
is not universally accepted) [3]. Functional 
models represent basic system functions 
and the basic flows of information, material, 
or energy transferred between individual 
functions and through the system boundary 
[1]. Individual functions perform actions on 
energy, material, or information flows [4]. 
Functional modeling as generally practiced 
in system architecting efforts often only 
analyzes nominal system configurations and 
states. Extensions to functional modeling 
have been developed over the last decade to 
analyze potential failure propagation paths 
and determine mitigation strategies [5]. 
Function Failure Identification Propagation 
(FFIP) was developed to model failure flows 
propagating through system functions and 
the resulting system-level failure outcomes 
[3, 6]. FFIP can be used to predict failure 
propagation paths and failure outcomes. 
However, FFIP cannot account for failures 
that cross functional boundaries or most 
common cause failures. The Function Failure 
Design Method (FFDM) provides a Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)-style 
failure analysis tool to be used with func-
tional modeling [7, 8, 9, 10]. FFDM can 
be used to find a large variety of potential 
failure modes for individual functions but 
FFDM cannot analyze failure propagations 
across non-nominal flow paths or com-
mon cause failure events. The Uncoupled 
Failure Flow State Reasoner (UFFSR) was 
developed to address the issue of analyzing 
uncoupled failure flow propagation in FFM 
[11, 12]. The UFFSR provides a geometric 
basis for analyzing failure flow propagation 
across uncoupled functions. An extension 
of UFFSR was developed to model failure 
flow arrestor functions in functional mod-
eling. The Dedicated Failure Flow Arres-
tor Function (DFFAF) method replicates 
placing physical barriers between redundant 
systems to prevent a failure in one system 
from crossing an air gap to the other sys-
tem [13]. Other methods such as Function 
Flow Decision Functions (FFDF) [14], a 
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method of developing prognostic and health 
management systems via functional fail-
ure modeling [15], the Time Based Failure 
Flow Evaluator (TBFFE) method [16], and 
methods to understand potential functional 
failure inputs to systems that are hard to 
predict [17] have added additional capabil-
ities to FFM in an effort to develop a more 
complete FFM toolbox for practitioners.
PRA is a well-established discipline of 
risk analysis with over 50 years of heritage 
for complex systems used in a variety of 
industries including aerospace, petroleum, 
automotive, and civilian nuclear power, 
among other areas. System failure models 
are developed using event and fault trees 
where event trees generally show the pro-
gression of a failure through systems and 
fault trees generally show the progression of 
failure within systems. Probabilistic fail-
ure data is attached to basic failure events 
and through Bayesian statistical methods 
and Boolean algebra, a probabilistic system 
failure rate can be calculated. However, PRA 
in its basic form does not capture emer-
gent system behavior during failure events. 
Instead, specific methodologies are used to 
assess specific emergent system behavior 
such as during fire or flood events in civilian 
nuclear reactors [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 
25]. While many emergent system behav-
iors are identified by fire and flood analysis, 
other emergent system behaviors can remain 
hidden from analysts [26, 19, 27, 28].
Common cause failure in particular 
has had significant attention paid over 
the course of PRA methodological devel-
opment. Failure inducing events such as 
maintenance errors across a series of identi-
cal, redundant valves can lead to a common 
cause failure of all maintained valves. Fire 
and flood events often can become common 
cause failures, causing failure of every system 
in a specific area of a system. Other exam-
ples include explosive, toxic, or radioactive 
gas clouds; salt mine or hard rock tunnel 
collapse; airplane, space debris, meteor, and 
other impacts; and explosive deconstruc-
tion of rotating turbomachinery sending 
out shrapnel. Several methods have recently 
been developed to address common cause 
failure in functional modeling [29, 30, 31, 
32, 33, 34, 35, 36]. However, no method cur-
rently exists in the FFM toolbox to address 
the issue of common cause failure events 
destroying or disabling multiple cables rout-
ed through the same cable pathways, ducts, 
raceways, bulkhead or wall penetrations, or 
other cable routing methods. Most efforts 
in cable management to prevent common 
cause failures focus on separating redundant 
and backup system cabling; isolating control, 
motive power, and instrumentation cabling 
from one another; and ensuring adequate 
breaker coordination to prevent ground fault 
wire ignition events in cable raceways. These 
efforts are typically performed after system 
architecting efforts have been completed and 
ignore potential benefits of analyzing and 
planning cable routing and bundling in the 
early phases of design.
2. Methodology & Case Study
The CRFA method presented in this sec-
tion provides practitioners a useful method 
to develop a better understanding of cable 
routing and management during system 
architecture from a risk-based perspective. 
This section details the CRFA methodology 
and presents a case study of cable routing 
in a simplified Pressurized Water Reactor 
(PWR) nuclear power plant primary coolant 
loop pumping room where three redun-
dant pumping systems are co-located. Two 
pumps are required to be active at all times 
for proper core cooling with the third pump 
acting as a “swing” pump for maintenance 
purposes or coming online during a failure 
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event involving one of the other pumps.
Step 1 of the CRFA method is to devel-
op a functional model. Figure 1 shows the 
functional model of the pump room.
Step 2 involves calculating the system 
failure probabilities and failure flow paths 
using FFIP or other related FFMs as de-
sired. Here we use FFIP to calculate the 
failure rate of the system. In the case study, 
the system failure rate is calculated using 
FFIP at 5.3E-4/yr.
Step 3 associates failure probabilities 
with individual cables failing leading to a 
potential common cause failure event of all 
co-located cables. A practitioner used to the 
FFIP methodology can think of this step 
as adding another functional block into the 
functional model to represent a cable, rather 
than using a functional flow to represent the 
transmission of signal, energy, or material. 
For those who are more familiar with PRA, 
this is similar to adding a basic event of a 
common cause failure to a fault tree. For the 
purposes of the case study presented to illus-
trate CRFA method presented here, cables 
are defined as any electrical physical con-
veyance device which is generally referred to 
as a cable, wire, conductor, etc. The authors 
have found that CRFA can also be used 
with optical cables, pneumatic and hydraulic 
hoses and hard piping, and some bulk ma-
terial transport systems (e.g., conveyor belts, 
pneumatic tubes, slurry chutes, etc.). In the 
case study, individual cable failure rates were 
chosen from an appropriate and proprietary 
generic cabling failure database.
Step 4 determines all possible cable group-
ings. In this step, the practitioner can identify 
any specific cables that cannot be located next 
to other cables for regulatory or other reasons, 
and any specific cables that must be co-located. 
For example, if three cables are being analyzed, 
there are nine total possible cable combina-
tions. The case study has a total of 12 cables 
with 516 possible combinations.
Step 5 analyzes system failure probability 
when two or more cables are co-located in a 
raceway. The cable failure probabilities from 
Step 3 are used to determine if all cables in a 
cable bundle may fail simultaneously. FFIP is 
run with each potential cable grouping iden-
tified in Step 4. Results for each cable group-
ing are kept separate and rank ordered from 
highest to lowest system failure probability.
Step 6 sets the maximum threshold for 
system failure probability. The authors advise 
that the threshold be set above the base 
FFIP calculation as FFIP does not gener-
ally take into account common cause cable 
failure. Then all cable groupings that exceed 





















Group failure probability: 0.0074
System fails: true
Table 1: Representative CRFA results including cable groupings 
with highest system failure probabilities for the primary coolant 
loop pumping room case study.
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able configurations from a risk perspective. 
All cable groupings that were not marked as 
unacceptable configurations are thus accept-
able from a risk perspective and can be used, 
assuming no other mitigating circumstanc-
es, in physical system design. If no cable 
configuration is acceptable, this indicates a 
redesign of the functional model is needed. 
Additional redundant systems or redundant 
cables may also be warranted. Table 1 pres-
ents partial results from the case study where 
a total of 516 potential cable groupings were 
identified, 210 groupings were rejected due 
to co-location exclusions (Step 4), and 313 
groupings were eliminated due to exceeding 
the maximum threshold set in Step 6, re-
sulting in 38 potential cable routing config-
urations meeting all criteria identified in the 
CRFA method. 
The CRFA method is now complete. 
Periodically through the rest of the concep-
tual design phase, CRFA should be re-run 
to verify that appropriate cable groupings 
and separations are maintained to meet fail-
ure probability expectations. When moving 
from system architecture and early system 
design into physical system design and lay-
out, the information from CRFA can then 
be used to develop cable raceways and locate 
individual cables.
3. Discussion
The CRFA method presented in the pre-
vious section has been implemented in 
software and automated. Figure 2 presents 
the Graphical User Interface (GUI) of the 
CRFA software tool that the authors de-
veloped. The case study in this paper was 
prepared using the software implementation 
of CRFA. In the future, the CRFA software 
is slated for integration with a larger effort 
to develop a complete FFM software toolkit.
In the authors’ experience, evidence of 
the success of CRFA can often be seen in 
redundant systems cabling being isolated 
from one another. Often this is because 
of Step 4 identifying cables that cannot 
be co-located. However, the authors have 
observed CRFA identifying on its own that 
redundant system cabling should not be 
co-located due to increased system failure 
probability. It is also possible that if the 
maximum threshold set in Step 6 is suffi-
ciently high, redundant system cabling isola-
tion may not be observed. This is potentially 
indicative of too high of a threshold being 
set or may also indicate that redundant sys-
tem cabling is unnecessary. It is recommend-
ed that further review of the results and a 
deeper understanding of why certain cables 
are more or less isolated is sought before 
moving forward if either case is identified.
Figure 2: The GUI of the software implementation of CRFA.
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While small-scale cable routing stud-
ies can be conducted using PRA tools and 
larger complex system cable routing analysis 
can be performed using specialized meth-
ods, the method presented in this paper 
integrates cable routing failure analysis with 
other FFMs, allowing a more holistic and 
integrated approach to system risk analysis. 
CRFA also provides the capability of ana-
lyzing common cause cable failures much 
earlier in the system design process during 
system architecture than existing methods 
allow. Shifting the analysis of common cause 
failures from cable routing to earlier in the 
system design process may save both time 
and money in the design process.
In the case where PRA is used to analyze 
cable failures without analyzing fire, flood, 
or missile (turbomachinery shrapnel) com-
mon cause failure, the PRA results will likely 
underestimate failure probability. Even when 
analyzing the fire, flood, or missile common 
cause failure sources, the results will likely 
not present as full and accurate of a picture of 
cable grouping failure risks as CRFA does.
CRFA has been used to conduct analysis 
on a variety of systems including civilian nu-
clear power plants of several types, aerospace 
systems, automotive systems, and defense 
systems. The results are promising and have 
been useful for practitioners to understand 
how cable routing and management can be 
greatly impacted by system architectural de-
cisions. Feedback from some users of CRFA 
indicate a desire for CRFA to be integrated 
into commonly used model based systems 
engineering (MBSE) tools.
Further development of CRFA is antic-
ipated including a more nuanced approach 
to cable bundling. CRFA assumes that all 
cables co-located in a raceway will all fail 
simultaneously when a common cause fail-
ure event occurs. However, not all common 
cause failure events will cause all cables to 
fail. For instance, a very hungry rat will not 
simultaneously eat through all data cables 
in a large bundle. A potential extension of 
CRFA may be to include aspects of TBFFE 
in the modeling of cable bundle failures to 
represent failure of cables in a bundle over 
time. Thus, CRFA is a conservative meth-
od in this regard. Another area of future 
improvement for CRFA is integrating the 
method with uncoupled failure flow meth-
ods such as UFFSR. Uncoupled failure flows 
can be accounted for to some degree in Step 
3 by assigning failure probabilities for com-
mon cause cable failures from potential un-
coupled sources such as missiles or floods (of 
cable insulation-eating liquids). However, 
some sources of uncoupled failure flow may 
be missed without integration of UFFSR.
Further future work includes adding 
the ability to the software implementation 
of CRFA to automatically add redundant 
cabling. For instance, civilian nuclear power 
plants often contain three redundant sensors 
with three redundant cables where a func-
tional model may only show one functional 
block to represent the three redundant sen-
sors and cables. Additional automation may 
provide the practitioner with a more rapid 
development process.
4. Conclusion
The CRFA method presented here provides 
a novel way of analyzing cable routing and 
determining cable routing schemes that are 
below a desired system failure probability 
threshold. Protecting critical cabling infra-
structure and separating redundant cables is 
vitally important to ensuring that a common 
cause failure does not cause a system-level 
failure event. Cable routing and planning 
currently happens late in the design process 
after major architectural decisions have been 
made and during physical system design. 
The CRFA method brings the analysis and 
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design of cable raceways and cable sepa-
ration to the system architecting phase of 
system design using FFM as a basis for 
further analysis. By having a more complete 
understanding of cable requirements during 
the early phases of system design, a system 
architecture and design can emerge that 
minimizes critical cabling infrastructure 
co-location and identifies the need for addi-
tional redundant cabling needs. Implement-
ing CRFA may help engineering practi-
tioners design complex systems and facilities 
that guard against cable failure propagation 
events that could disable or destroy the core 
functionality of the system. Thus, system 
reliability is expected to be increased while 
driving down system risks that may other-
wise have gone unaddressed.
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